

Growing Physician Access Problems Complicate Medicare Payment Debate
Issue Brief No. 55
September 2002
Sally Trude, Paul B. Ginsburg
rojected cuts in Medicare physician payments raise serious concerns that Medicare
beneficiaries will lose access to needed physician services. A study by the Center for
Studying Health System Change (HSC) shows growing physician access problems
among Medicare and privately insured patients. Patients have the most difficulties
obtaining care from specialists and in certain communities. Proposals to increase
Medicare fees across the board may prevent deterioration of access for Medicare
beneficiaries but are unlikely to address system-wide access problems that vary by
specialty and market.
Concerns About Access for Medicare Beneficiaries
he 5.4 percent cut in Medicare
physician payments for 2002 and
the expectation of additional cuts over
the next few years have raised concerns
that Medicare beneficiaries will face
serious problems obtaining needed
physician services. Congress is considering
legislation to replace these scheduled
reductions with modest increases
until a new Medicare physician payment
system is developed. These proposals
may prevent significant deterioration
in access to care for Medicare beneficiaries,
but factors outside of Medicare
have led to poorer access for all patients
and may continue to do so even if
future Medicare cuts are cancelled.
Three key measures of access are
whether patients delayed or did not
obtain needed care, whether patients
could get a timely appointment with
a physician and whether doctors are
taking new patients. Based on these
measures from HSCs Community
Tracking Study Household and
Physician Surveys (see Data Source), there is clear evidence that
access problems are on the rise:
- The
percentage of Medicare seniors
reporting delaying or not getting
needed care rose from 9.1 percent
in 1997 to 11.0 in 2001 (see Table
1). Similarly, the percentage of privately
insured people between the
ages of 50 and 64 (near-elderly) who
reported access problems increased
from 15.2 percent to 18.4 percent
over the same period.1
- Both Medicare seniors and older
privately insured people are also
waiting longer for appointments
with their physicians (see Table 2).
By 2001, more than a third of
Medicare seniors waited more
than three weeks for a checkup. A
similar percentage waited a week
or more for an appointment for a
specific illness.
- The proportion of physicians
accepting all new Medicare patients
fell from 74.6 percent to 71.1 percent
over the past four years (see Table
3). The proportion of physicians
accepting all new privately insured
patients also dropped. Moreover,
the proportion of physicians who
are not accepting any new patients
-Medicare or privately insured-
grew over the same period.
Physicians with the weakest connection
to Medicare were most likely to
refuse to accept new Medicare patients.
In 2001, 16.3 percent of physicians
whose Medicare practice was less than
10 percent of their practice revenue
closed their practices to new Medicare
patients. In contrast, less than 1 percent
of physicians with Medicare revenues making
up more than half of their practice revenue
closed their practices to new Medicare
patients in 2001.
Table 1
People Who Had Problems Obtaining Care, by Reason |
|
1997 |
1999 |
2001 |
Delayed or Put Off Care, Any Reason |
|
9.1% |
9.8% |
11.0%* |
Privately Insured Near-Elderly |
|
15.2 |
17.6 |
18.4* |
Reasons for Delaying or Putting Off
Care |
Couldnt Get Appointment Soon Enough |
|
13.9 |
16.3 |
23.6* |
Privately Insured Near-Elderly |
|
21.8 |
20.8 |
25.1* |
Couldnt Get Through
on Phone |
|
7.1 |
4.8 |
11.3* |
Privately Insured Near-Elderly |
|
7.2 |
7.6 |
9.1 |
* Change from 1997 to 2001 is
statistically significant at p<.05. Source: Community Tracking
Study Household Survey |
Table 2
People Reporting Long Waits for Medical Checkups and Illness Visits, Comparison
of Medicare Seniors and Privately Insured Near-Elderly |
|
1997 |
1999 |
2001 |
Delay for Checkup Appointment Exceeds
3 Weeks |
|
32.1% |
35.0% |
37.1%* |
Privately Insured Near-Elderly |
|
25.8 |
28.7 |
33.1* |
Delay for Illness Appointment Exceeds
1 Week |
|
34.6 |
41.3 |
40.3* |
Privately Insured Near-Elderly |
|
29.9 |
35.2 |
36.3* |
* Change from 1997 to 2001 is statistically
significant at p<.05. Source: Community Tracking Study Household
Survey |
Table 3
Physicians Accepting New Medicare and Private Patients |
|
1997 |
1999 |
2001 |
Accepting All New Patients |
Medicare |
74.6% |
72.5% |
71.1%* |
Private |
70.8 |
70.5 |
68.2* |
Accepting No New Patients |
Medicare |
3.1 |
3.4 |
3.8* |
Private |
3.6 |
3.6 |
4.9* |
* Change from 1997 to 2001 is statistically
significant at p<.05. Source: Community Tracking Study Physician
Survey |
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Access to Specialist Care Declines
he Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA) made three substantial changes to Medicare payment for specialists. First, it replaced separate
conversion factors for primary care, surgical services and other nonsurgical
services with a single conversion factor (see box). Second,
it increased the work relative value units for some services. And third, it
began the transition to new practice expense relative values. These changes
reflected a return to the intended goal of Medicare physician payment policy
to pay based on the amount of physician work required per service rather than
the credentials or educational background of the physician. As a result of the
BBAs changes, average payments for all physicians increased about 7 percent
from 1998 to 2002, but payments fell 14 percent for cardiac surgeons and 10
percent for thoracic surgeons.2
During 1997-2001, surgeons willingness
to accept all new Medicare patients declined
from 81.5 percent to 73.0 percent. At the same
time, the proportion of medical specialists
accepting all new Medicare patients grew
slightly from 76.3 percent to 78.9 percent.
Surgeons acceptance of new privately
insured patients showed similar declines,
while medical specialists showed virtually
no change.
Delays obtaining appointments with surgical and medical specialists have become
particularly troublesome for Medicare seniors and older privately insured people.
Roughly half of Medicare seniors must wait at least three weeks for a checkup
with a specialist, and almost three in four must wait more than a week to see
a specialist for a specific illness. Comparable percentages of older privately
insured people also face delays in access to specialists. This inability to
schedule appointments on a timely basis may be contributing to physicians growing
refusal to accept new patients.
Because both Medicare and privately
insured patients are affected, current
problems of access to specialists are likely
unrelated to the BBA fee cuts. However, if
payment differentials between private payers
and Medicare increase in the future, that
may limit beneficiaries choice of specialists.
Many health plans use Medicares fee
schedule to benchmark their physician
payments, which sometimes leads to
turmoil. In Seattle, for example, about 150
specialists refused to renew their contracts
with Regence Blue Shield, the largest insurer
in Washington, when it revised its payments
to conform to the new relative values in
the Medicare fee schedule.3
To get the
specialists to renew their contracts, Regence
agreed to continue paying more for surgical
services. In other communities, specialty
differentials were maintained as specialty
practices and medical groups negotiated
higher contract rates than those of primary
care practices. As a result, Medicare
beneficiaries may find their choices among
specialists dwindling if payment differentials
between Medicare and private payment
grow. The differentials between Medicare
and private payments vary by market, so
access problems also vary by community.
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Market Variation in Access and Relative Payment
he extent and type of access problems
Medicare beneficiaries face depend on
where people live. Moreover, the nature
of access problems tends to be complex
and cannot be captured with a single
measure. For example, of the 12 nationally
representative communities where HSC
conducts site visits, Seattle has shown the
steepest decline in physicians willingness
to accept new Medicare patients. In 1997,
71 percent of Seattle physicians were willing
to accept all new Medicare patients, but in
2001, only 55 percent were willing. At the
same time, the proportion of Seattle physicians
willing to accept all new private
patients fell from 71 percent to 62 percent.
As a result, Seattle now ranks as the lowest
of the 12 markets in physician willingness
to accept all new Medicare patients.
Despite this drop, Seattle still ranks
highest in other measures of access to care.
For example, only 8 percent of Medicare
beneficiaries in Seattle report putting off
or delaying care, compared with 15 percent
to 16 percent in Cleveland, Indianapolis,
Miami, Phoenix and Orange County, Calif.
Medicare beneficiaries in Seattle are
also less likely to face appointment delays.
About 24 percent of Medicare beneficiaries
in Seattle face a delay obtaining a checkup,
compared with 55 percent to 56 percent in
Boston and Syracuse. And 55 percent of
Seattles Medicare beneficiaries must delay
an appointment for a specific illness,
compared with 70 percent in Boston.
Ironically, Boston ranks among the highest
of the 12 markets studied in physician
willingness to accept all new Medicare
patients but has some of the highest rates
of appointment delays.
Monitoring Medicare access is complicated
further by the wide variation in how
health plans pay physicians relative to
Medicare. In Northern New Jersey, private
insurers use Medicare physician payments
as a ceiling, while in Little Rock, private
physician payment rates are much higher
than what Medicare pays. Nor do plans
mimic annual changes to Medicares
rates. In five of the 12 communities, health
plans reported, on average, that private
payments had fallen relative to Medicare
payments. That is, when Medicare physician
payment rates increased roughly 5
percent in 2000 and again in 2001, health
plans did not follow suit with comparable
increases.
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Implications for Policy Makers
edicare physician payment policy often has been driven
by congressional efforts to reduce the federal budget deficit, con-strained
by concerns about access and physician representatives pleas for fairness.
In 1989, Congress created the Medicare fee schedule that included a formula
linking annual changes in payment rates to changes in the number and type of
physician services provided to Medicare patients. Lawmakers have revised this
for-mla twice to achieve budget savings. A first cut in 1993 was followed by
the 1997 BBA that sought more savings-$5.3 billion from 1998 to 2002 and $11.7
billion by 2007. The Congressional Budget Office estimated that payments to
physicians over 1998-2002 would decline by 0.7 percent under the 1993 law and
by 9.3 percent under the BBA.4
Although previous payment changes have had little or no effect on Medicare
beneficiaries access to care, the prospect of unprecedented sharp declines
in physician payment rates raises serious concerns. Unless Congress acts to
change current law, Medicare physician fees are expected to drop again in 2003
and 2004.5 Lawmakers have proposed repealing the
future cuts and providing modest increases over the next few years.
However, policy makers should not expect
to address system-wide access problems
through Medicare payment policy. The access
declines witnessed in the four years preceding
the Medicare payment cut may be temporary
and may relate to such non-Medicare factors
as patients demand for physician services,
changes in private insurance, the number
and type of available physicians and local
market conditions. Moreover, Medicares
national payment formula may be too blunt
an instrument to address access problems
that vary by specialty and market.
Finally, to accurately assess Medicare beneficiaries access to care, policy
makers should monitor access for the privately insured as well as avoid attributing
system-wide problems to Medicare. For example, hotlines that collect complaints
about Medicare patients access problems will overlook similar problems of access
occurring for the privately insured.
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Medicare Physician Payment in a Nutshell
edicare physician payment is based on the principle that payments for different services
should reflect differences in physician work. Physicians incur three types of costs to produce
a service: work (their own time, energy and skill); practice expenses (medical equipment
and space); and malpractice insurance. Medicares fee schedule calculates a total relative value
unit for each service based on these costs, and payments are determined by these relative values
and a conversion factor that translates relative values into dollar amounts for each service.
When Medicares fee schedule was first implemented in 1992, physicians were paid $31
per relative value unit. A physician providing a service with 10 relative value units would have
been paid $310 for that service. A volume control mechanism links payment to growth in the
number and mix of services physicians provide. The conversion factor is adjusted annually to
hold Medicare spending for physician services to limits set by a formula specified by legislation.
In 2001, the relative value unit was $38.26. In 2002, it dropped to $36.20.
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Data Source
his Issue Brief presents findings
from the HSC Community Tracking
Study Physician and Household
Surveys conducted in 1996-97,
1998-99 and 2000-01. They are
both nationally representative
telephone surveys. For discussion
and presentation, we refer to a
single calendar year of the survey
(1997, 1999 and 2001).
The Physician Survey is of
nonfederal, patient care physicians
who spend at least 20 hours a week
in direct patient care. Each round
of the survey contains information
on about 12,500 physicians, and
the response rates ranged from 61
percent to 65 percent.
The Household Survey is of the
civilian, noninstitutionalized population.
Data were supplemented
by in-person interviews of households
without telephones to ensure
proper representation. Each round
of the survey contains information
on about 60,000 people, and the
response rates ranged from 60
percent to 65 percent.
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Notes
1. |
These analyses compare Medicare seniors to
privately insured people 50 to 64 years of age
because of the similarities in their medical
resource use.
|
2. |
"New Data Specify Pay Cuts for 32 Specialties in 2002," Part B News,
Vol. 15, No. 48 (Dec. 17, 2001). |
3. |
Strunk, Bradley C., Kelly Devers and Robert E. Hurley, Health Plan-Provider
Showdowns on the Rise, Issue Brief No. 40, Center for Studying Health
System Change, Washington, D.C. (June 2001). |
4. |
Congressional Budget Office, Budgetary Implications of the Balanced
Budget Act of 1997 (December 1997). |
5. |
Office of the Actuary, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Estimate
Sustainable Growth Rate and Conversion Factor for Medicare Payments to Physicians
in 2003, N3- 01-21 (March 1, 2002). |
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ISSUE BRIEFS are published by the Center for Studying Health System Change.
President: Paul B. Ginsburg
Director of Public Affairs: Richard Sorian
Editor: The Stein Group
For additional copies or to be added
to the mailing list, contact HSC at:
600 Maryland Avenue, SW
Suite 550
Washington, DC 20024-2512
Tel: (202) 554-7549
(for publication information)
Tel: (202) 484-5261
(for general HSC information)
Fax: (202) 484-9258
www.hschange.org
|